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I.  INTRODUCTION 
You have had a really bad day.  Your neighbor killed your dog, a 
mixed-breed dog you rescued from the pound, which your two-year-old 
daughter adored.  Someone copied one of your songs to her iPhone without 
paying the required ninety-nine cents.1  At the end of your dinner out, your 
restaurant printed a receipt showing the last six digits of your credit card 
number in violation of a rule that required redaction of all but the last five.  
You were then denied entrance to a night club because of your race. 
Perhaps you should sue.  (This is, after all, a law review article.)  But 
what are your damages?  Economically, the death of your dog may have 
been a gain, not a loss at all; your much-loved dog had a negligible fair 
market value and promised to cost you large amounts for food and health 
care over its lifetime.  Your loss from the illegal download is easily 
measured—you are out the ninety-nine cents (or, more accurately, your 
share of it)—but a lawsuit to recover that amount would be impractical.  It 
is unlikely that printing six digits of your credit card number will cause 
you any harm whatever, notwithstanding the clear violation of the relevant 
regulatory regime.  And even if your exclusion from the nightclub denied 
your equal dignity as a human being and offended core American values, 
it may have caused you no economic or other concrete damage and 
annoyed you only slightly.  What is a legal system to do? 
Either federal law or the law of one or more states addresses these 
problems by awarding statutory damages—damages to which you may be 
entitled without having to prove the amount, or more commonly even the 
existence, of actual damages under ordinary common law principles.  In 
Tennessee, a pet owner may obtain non-economic damages up to $5000 
for the death of his or her pet against the person who is liable for causing 
                                                          
  Clinical Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. 
 1.  Middle tier pricing of songs on iTunes as of January 23, 2018.  See 
https://www.apple.com/itunes/music/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2018) (advertising the “more than 43 
million high-quality, DRM-free songs on iTunes for just 69¢, 99¢, or $1.29 each”). 
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the death or injuries that led to the animal’s death.2  The person causing 
the pet’s death must have done so intentionally or, if negligently, the 
incident must have occurred either on the owner or pet caretaker’s property 
or while in the control and supervision of the caretaker.3  Under section 
504(c) of the Copyright Act, a plaintiff may recover statutory damages, in 
lieu of actual damages, of between $750 and $30,000 per infringed work, 
as the finder of fact deems “just.”4  No actual damages need be shown.  If 
the finder of fact finds that the infringement was “willful,” it can award up 
to $150,000 per infringed work.5  Section 1681n(a) of the federal Fair and 
Accurate Credit Transactions Act (“FACTA”) awards statutory damages 
of between $100 and $1000 for willful failure to comply with the act’s 
disclosure requirements,6 including its requirement that retailers redact all 
but the last five digits of the customer’s credit card from any printed 
receipt.7  Finally, in California, anyone discriminated against on the basis 
of race, national origin, religion, or disability in access to public 
accommodations can recover $4000 in statutory damages.8 
On its face, authorization of statutory damages might seem to 
constitute a simple, reasonable, and straightforward solution to what might 
otherwise be difficult and expensive litigation problems.  But consider 
some recent difficulties. 
In Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC,9 plaintiff record company 
sought an award of approximately $1.5 billion in statutory damages for 
infringement of its songs by defendant.10  Observing that plaintiffs also 
sought damages from individual users, which could amount to trillions of 
                                                          
 2.  Known as the “T-Bo Act,” TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(a)(1) (West 2010); see also 
Lauren M. Sirois, Comment, Recovering for the Loss of a Beloved Pet: Rethinking the Legal 
Classification of Companion Animals and the Requirements for Loss of Companionship Tort 
Damages, 163 U. PENN. L. REV. 1199, 1203 (2015) (referring to the “T-Bo Act”). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2012). 
 5.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012). 
 6.  15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 7.  15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) (2012). 
 8.  CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51, 52 (West 2007, Supp. 2014 & Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.).  
Proof of actual damages is not a prerequisite to recovery of statutory minimum damages under 
California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act; “plaintiff need only show that he was denied full and equal 
access, not that he was wholly excluded from enjoying defendant’s services,” and plaintiff in an action 
alleging denial of equal access to public accommodation can recover statutory damages “even if he 
did not enter the facility.” Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 2014) 
(citations omitted). 
 9.  784 F. Supp. 2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
 10.  Id. at 317 (explaining that multiplying the maximum statutory damage award of $150,000 
per work for willful infringement by approximately 10,000 infringements results in “a potential award 
of over a billion dollars in statutory damages alone”). 
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dollars, the court noted, “Plaintiffs are suggesting an award that is ‘more 
money than the entire music recording industry has made since Edison’s 
invention of the phonograph in 1877.’”11 
Similarly, in Blanco v. CEC Entertainment Concepts L.P.,12 plaintiff 
alleged that Chuck E. Cheese, a chain restaurant catering to children, had 
printed prohibited credit card information in violation of FACTA—
specifically by printing more than the last five digits of the card number 
or expiration dates on its receipts.13  Because the case was brought as a 
class action, statutory damages were expected to range from a minimum 
of $198,025,000 to a maximum of $1,980,250,000, notwithstanding the 
fact that plaintiff admitted she had incurred no actual harm and could not 
allege any harm to the class.14  The court noted that the “end result would 
be grossly disproportionate to the harm, especially when Defendant 
immediately rectified this technical problem after the lawsuit was filed.”15  
Although the court denied class certification, the case achieved notoriety 
because of the size of the requested award.16  The case raised an obvious 
question: Is a two-billion dollar penalty really necessary to induce 
restaurants to print the right number of digits on their receipts?  We will 
refer to the compounding of statutory damages in class actions as the 
“Chuck E. Cheese problem” below. 
Or compare the following two cases. In Capitol Records Inc. v. 
Thomas, defendant, a single mother, illegally downloaded and shared 
twenty-four songs over the Internet.17  A jury originally awarded statutory 
damages of $9250 per song,18 for a total of $220,000, a verdict which the 
trial judge vacated as “wholly disproportionate” to the damages suffered 
by plaintiff record company.19  On remand, the jury increased the award 
to $80,000 per song, for a total award of $1.92 million.20  The facts in BMG 
                                                          
 11.  Id. (quoting Def. Mem. at 2–3). 
 12.  No. CV 07-0559 GPS JWJx, 2008 WL 239658 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008). 
 13.  Id. at *1. 
 14.  Id. at *2. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory Damages and 
Class Actions, 74 MO. L. REV. 103, 104–06 (2009) (discussing large awarded amounts in FACTA 
class action cases). 
 17.  579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212–13 (D. Minn. 2008). 
 18.  See id. at 1213. 
 19.  Id. at 1227. 
 20.  Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1048–50 (D. Minn. 2010) 
(remitting award from $80,000 to $2,250 per song); see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 
799 F. Supp. 2d 999 (D. Minn. 2011) (reducing third trial’s total award of $1.5 million to $54,000 
($2250 per song), which the court believed was the maximum permitted under the Due Process 
Clause), vacated, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012) (rejecting constitutional argument and reinstating 
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Music v. Gonzalez were similar: an individual consumer downloaded 
thirty songs without paying for them.21  She, however, was only required 
to pay $750 per song, the statutory minimum, for a total award of 
$22,500.22  An award of just over $20,000 in one case and of just under 
$2,000,000 in a very similar one—almost a hundred-fold difference for no 
apparent reason.  If law is to be based on neutral principles, not on whether 
the judge or jury likes or dislikes a particular party, this kind of 
unexplained disparity is troubling.  It seems fundamentally inconsistent 
with the rule of law. 
Another pair of cases, this time under the Cable Piracy Act, which 
similarly provides no guidance as to how courts are to determine what is 
“just”:23  In Time Warner Cable of New York City v. Taco Rapido 
Restaurant, the court based statutory damages on the number of people 
who viewed the infringed television show.24  In Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. 
v. McBroom, defendant was ordered to pay instead an amount equal to the 
licensing fee it would have paid if it had purchased the programming 
legally.25  Same violations, different outcomes, no explanation. 
Perhaps a less serious problem, but a problem nonetheless, followed 
in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Doe v. Chao.26  Focusing 
on the plain language of the statute and without referencing the purposes 
of statutory damages generally, the Court there held that under the Privacy 
Act of 1974,27 statutory damages were only available if plaintiff could 
prove at least some actual damages other than emotional distress.28  Lower 
courts have since split on whether to apply Doe to statutory damage 
provisions in other federal statutes, although most have ultimately 
declined to do so.  The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have applied Doe to 
the Stored Communications Act;29 all other lower courts that have 
                                                          
original award of $9,250 per song for total $220,000 damages). 
 21.  No. 03 C 6276, 2005 WL 106592, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2005) aff’d, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 
2005). 
 22.  Id.  In Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell, No. CV-06-02076-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 
4080008, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 29, 2008), defendant was similarly assessed the minimum permitted 
statutory damages ($40,500.00) for using a file-sharing program on his home computer to illegally 
download fifty-four songs and distribute them to other users of the network.  
 23.  47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II) (2012). 
 24.  988 F. Supp. 107, 111 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 25.  No. 5:09–cv–276(CAR), 2009 WL 5031580, at *4 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 15, 2009). 
 26.  540 U.S. 614 (2004). 
 27.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (2012 & Supp. 2014). 
 28.  See Chao, 540 U.S. at 617–18, 626. 
 29.  Vista Mktg., LLC v. Burkett, 812 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 2016); Van Alstyne v. Elec. 
Scriptorium, Ltd., 560 F.3d 199, 204–06 (4th Cir. 2009). 
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considered the question as applied to the SCA have gone the other way.30  
The Third and Eleventh Circuits have declined to apply it to the Driver’s 
Privacy Protection Act;31 district courts in the Eleventh Circuit, however, 
initially viewed themselves as bound by Doe.32  Lower courts have also 
declined to apply Doe’s logic to the Video Privacy Protection Act,33 the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act,34 and the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions 
Act.35  Confusion seems to be the order of the day. 
Several articles have explored problems created by the Copyright 
Act’s statutory damage provisions, where some of the most widely 
publicized cases have arisen.36  This article, however, is the first to explore 
the field of statutory damages generally.  Part II offers a survey of some 
of the many contexts in which statutory damages are available in state and 
federal law.  Part III explores the purposes of such provisions.  As will be 
                                                          
 30.  See, e.g., Shefts v. Petrakis, 931 F. Supp. 2d 916, 919 (C.D. Ill. 2013); Pure Power Boot 
Camp, Inc. v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, LLC, 759 F. Supp. 2d 417, 427–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); 
Freedman v. Town of Fairfield, No. 3:03CV01048 (PCD), 2006 WL 2684347, at *3 (D. Conn. Sept. 
19, 2006); In re Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 355 B.R. 225, 230–31 (D. Haw. 2006). 
 31.  Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 397–400 (3d Cir. 2008) (no actual damages required); 
Kehoe v. Fid. Fed. Bank & Tr., 421 F.3d 1209, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005) (same).  But see Potocnik v. 
Carlson, No. 13–CV–2093 (PJS/HB), 2016 WL 3919950, at *10–12 (D. Minn. July 15, 2016) (actual 
damages required to recover liquidated damages under DPPA). 
 32.  See Kehoe v. Fid. Fed. Bank & Tr., No. 03–80593-CIV-HURLEY/LYNCH, 2004 WL 
1659617, at *6–8 (S.D. Fla. June 14, 2004) (actual damages required), rev’d, 421 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 
2005); Schmidt v. Multimedia Holdings Corp., 361 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1356 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (same). 
 33.  See, e.g., In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. C 11–03764 LB, 2013 WL 6773794, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 20, 2013).  One district court has refused to extend Doe’s logic to Michigan’s Video Rental 
Privacy Act, the state’s version of the Video Privacy Protection Act.  Halaburda v. Bauer Publ’g Co., 
No. 12-CV-12831, 2013 WL 4012827, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 6, 2013). 
 34.  See, e.g., Arcilla v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 965, 973–
74 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Blanco v. El Pollo Loco, Inc., No. SACV 07–54 JVSRNBX, 2007 WL 1113997, 
at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2007). 
 35.  See, e.g., Follman v. Vill. Squire, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 816, 822–23 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 36.  See, e.g., Andrew Berger, Statutory Damages in Copyright Litigation, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., 
Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 30; James DeBriyn, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass 
Copyright Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 79 (2012); R. Buck 
McKinney, Guardrail to Guardrail: Statutory Damage Awards in Copyright Infringement Litigation, 
LANDSLIDE, May–June 2010, at 8; Christopher Pooser, Statutory Damages Under the Copyright Act, 
ADVOC. (IDAHO), Aug.–Sept. 2007, at 23; Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages 
in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009); J. Cam Barker, 
Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing: The Troubling Effects of 
Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REV. 525 (2004); 
Kate Cross, Comment, David v. Goliath: How the Record Industry Is Winning Substantial Judgments 
Against Individuals for Illegally Downloading Music, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1031 (2010); Damias A. 
Wilson, Note, Copyright’s Compilation Conundrum: Modernizing Statutory Damage Awards for the 
Digital Music Marketplace, 85 SAINT JOHN’S L. REV. 1189 (2011); Sarah A. Zawada, Comment, 
“Infringed” Versus “Infringing”: Different Interpretations of the Word “Work” and the Effect on the 
Deterrence Goal of Copyright Law, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 129 (2006); Betselot A. Zeleke, 
Comment, Federal Judges Gone Wild: The Copyright Act of 1976 and Technology, Rejecting the 
Independent Economic Value Test, 55 HOW. L.J. 247 (2011). 
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seen, statutory damages are typically authorized in contexts in which 
actual damages are hard to prove or are believed to be inadequate either to 
encourage private enforcement or deter prohibited behavior.  Part IV turns 
to some of the problems statutory damage rules have triggered, together 
with possible solutions.  Part V, finally, concludes. 
II.  A SAMPLING OF STATUTORY DAMAGE PROVISIONS 
To better understand both the problems statutory damages are 
designed to address and the problems they sometimes create, it may be 
useful to begin by reviewing a sample of existing statutory damage rules, 
both state and federal.  It is not possible exhaustively to catalogue all such 
rules, since statutory damage provisions are not identified as such in codes 
or compilations and no simple database search exists to identify them.  The 
rules explored in this Part II should therefore be viewed as illustrative.  
Nevertheless, for the most part, statutory damage rules appear to fall into 
four general categories: (1) rules for the protection of intellectual property, 
(2) business regulatory rules, now more commonly known as consumer or 
labor protection rules, (3) rules governing the protection or dissemination 
of information, and (4) civil rights rules.  A few provisions outside these 
four categories will be sampled as well. 
A. Rules for the Protection of Intellectual Property 
Statutory damages for violations of copyright have been part of Anglo-
American law for at least three centuries.  The Statute of Anne, enacted in 
1710, provided for damages of “one penny for every sheet which shall be 
found in [the infringer’s] custody.”37  Relative to the earnings of an 
average worker, this would constitute the equivalent of about £8.38, or 
$10.29, per sheet today.38  Early American copyright statutes followed this 
model but made damages more severe, providing in 1790 for damages of 
$0.50 per sheet39 (equivalent to $251 in 2015 relative to the earnings of the 
average unskilled worker or $694 relative to the earning of the average 
                                                          
 37.  8 Ann. c. 19 (1710). 
 38.   Five Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a UK Pound Amount, 1270 to Present, 
MEASURINGWORTH, https://www.measuringworth.com/ukcompare/ (enter “1710” in “Initial Year” 
field, “1” in pence “Initial Amount” field, and “2015” in “Desired Year” field); GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.co.uk/search?sourceid=chrome-psyapi2&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-
8&q=pounds%20to%20dollars&oq=pounds%20to% 20dollars& aqs=chrome..69i57j0l5.3174j0j7 
(enter “8.38” in “British Pound” field for current equivalent in American dollars) (conversion 
calculated on March 2, 2017). 
 39.  Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 2, 1 Stat. 124, 124–25. 
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manufacturing worker40) and in 1802 for damages of $1.00 per print41 
(equivalent to $248 in 2015 relative to the earnings of the average 
unskilled worker or $694 relative to the earning of the average 
manufacturing worker42). 
In 1856, Congress permitted plaintiffs to prove actual damages in 
excess of the statutory minimum,43 providing for damages for the 
infringement of dramatic compositions “to be . . . assessed at such sum, 
not less than one hundred dollars for the first, and fifty dollars for every 
subsequent performance, as to the court having cognizance thereof shall 
appear to be just.”44  ($100 in 1856 was equivalent to $19,700 in 2015 
relative to the earnings of the average unskilled worker or $45,600 relative 
to the earning of the average manufacturing worker45).  The Supreme 
Court, in Brady v. Daly,46 explained that the then-new statute “provide[d] 
a minimum sum for a recovery in any case, leaving it open for a larger 
recovery upon proof of greater damage in those cases where such proof 
can be made.” 
Discretionary statutory damages for copyright violations without 
proof of actual damages in excess of the statutory minimum were 
introduced in 1909.47  Opponents of the change asserted that discretionary 
damages of this kind were unprecedented.48  As will be seen, this assertion 
                                                          
 40.  Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount - 1774 to Present, 
MEASURINGWORTH, https://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (to obtain the “labor earnings” 
measure under “income or wealth,” enter “1790” in the “Initial Year” field, “0.50” in the “Initial 
Amount” field, and “2015” in the “Desired Year” field).  The difference between equivalents 
computed by reference to earnings of unskilled workers and equivalents computed by reference to 
earnings of manufacturing workers is presumably due to the increase, over time, of the latter relative 
to the former. 
 41.  Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 3, 2 Stat. 171, 171–72. 
 42.  Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount - 1774 to Present, 
MEASURINGWORTH, https://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (to obtain the “labor earnings” 
measure under “income or wealth,” enter “1802” in the “Initial Year” field, “1.00” in the “Initial 
Amount” field, and “2015” in the “Desired Year” field). 
 43.  Copyright Act Amendment 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138. 
 44.  Id. at 139. 
 45.  Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount - 1774 to Present, 
MEASURINGWORTH, https://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (to obtain the “labor earnings” 
measure under “income or wealth,” enter “1856” in the “Initial Year” field, “100” in the “Initial 
Amount” field, and “2015” in the “Desired Year” field). 
 46.  175 U.S. 148, 154 (1899). 
 47.  Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 25(b), 35 Stat. 1075, 1081. 
 48.  “[Y]ou have gone away beyond . . . any common-law right or remedy that has ever been 
given in a statute before. . . . You have made provision by which the recovery of costs shall be such 
as never have appeared in any federal court before.” Arguments Before the House Copyright 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Patents, Jan. 20, 1909 (statement of Mr. Parkinson), reprinted in  
5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT L31 (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman 
eds., 1976). 
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was not completely true, but such damages were certainly new to the 
American copyright regime.  Of the new law, the Second Circuit stated in 
S.E. Hendricks Co. v. Thomas Publishing Co.49 that: “it was the intention 
of Congress . . . to give the new right of application to the court for such 
damages as shall ‘appear to be just,’ in lieu of actual damages.”50 
Plaintiffs could now receive damages greater than the statutory 
minimum without proving anything other than bare infringement, and 
without any guidance to the decision-maker other than to award such 
damages as shall “appear to be just.”51  Finally, in 1998, in Feltner v. 
Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., the Supreme Court held that as a 
matter of constitutional law, in a copyright or any other case tried before 
a jury “‘in which legal rights [are] to be ascertained and determined, in 
contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone [are] recognized,’” 
the amount of any statutory damage award had to be set by the jury.52 
Under section 504(c) of the Copyright Act today, plaintiff, at its 
election, may recover statutory damages ranging from a minimum of $750 
per work infringed up to $30,000 per work infringed, all as the jury 
considers “just,” without any showing of actual damage.53  If the jury finds 
that the infringement was “willful,” it can award up to $150,000 per 
work.54  In awarding plaintiff only $1.92 million as damages for 
defendant’s unauthorized downloading of twenty-four songs, therefore, 
the jury in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset was being kind to 
defendant.  It could have awarded up to $3.6 million. 
Congress has used the same model to protect trademarks.  The Lanham 
Act of 1946, also known as the Trademark Registration Act,55 protects 
trademarked goods from being copied and sold fraudulently.  It provides 
that in a case involving use of a counterfeit mark56 in the selling of any 
goods, plaintiff may choose to recover, in lieu of actual damages and 
without proving any such damages, an award of statutory damages in an 
amount not less than $1000 nor more than $200,000 per item if the 
                                                          
 49.  242 F. 37 (2d Cir. 1917). 
 50.  Id. at 41–42. 
 51.  See id.; see also Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., 230 F. 412, 413 (2d Cir. 1916) (1909 Act 
giving courts the power to award damages “without the limitations of usual legal proof”); Woodman 
v. Lydiard-Peterson Co., 192 F. 67, 71 (D. Minn. 1912) (expressing confusion about existence and 
purpose of statutory damages in the 1909 Act). 
 52.  523 U.S. 340, 348, 353 (1998) (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830)). 
 53.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2012). 
 54.  Id. § 504(c)(2). 
 55.  Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 56.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (2012) (defining “counterfeit mark”). 
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violation is not willful, or up to $2,000,000 per item if the use is willful.57  
The finder of fact has discretion to make an award within those limits.58 
By contrast, statutory damages are not available in the U.S. for patent 
violations, willful or otherwise.59  Internationally, it appears that only 
China and Russia authorize statutory damages in such circumstances.60  
Why is unclear. 
B. Business Regulation (now Consumer or Labor Protection) 
Another context in which statutory damages have long been used is 
that of business regulation—for the most part what today we would call 
consumer or labor protection.  The first Supreme Court case to consider 
whether and in what circumstances statutory damages might violate due 
process arose in this context.  In St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern 
Railway Co. v. Williams,61 an 1887 Arkansas law awarded damages of “not 
less than fifty dollars nor more than three hundred dollars and costs of suit, 
including a reasonable attorney’s fee” to any passenger charged more for 
passage by a railroad company than the amount prescribed by law.62  ($50 
and $300 in 1887 were equivalent, respectively, to $7,040 and $42,200 in 
2015 relative to the earnings of the average unskilled worker or to $12,100 
and $72,700 relative to the earnings of the average manufacturing 
worker63).  In the event, the railroad had overcharged plaintiffs by sixty-
six cents.64  The Court upheld the jury’s $75 statutory damage award 
nonetheless, quoting Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Humes65 to the effect 
that 
the power of the state to impose fines and penalties for a violation of its 
statutory requirements is coeval with government; and the mode in 
which they shall be enforced, whether at the suit of a private party, or at 
                                                          
 57.  15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2012). 
 58.  See id. § 1117(c)(1)–(2). 
 59.  See Thomas F. Cotter, Statutory Damages, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (Apr. 13, 
2016, 8:13 AM), http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2016/04/statutory-damages.html. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  251 U.S. 63 (1919). 
 62.  Id. at 64 (quoting the relevant Arkansas statutes). 
 63.  Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount - 1774 to Present, 
MEASURINGWORTH, https://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (to obtain the “labor earnings” 
measure under “income or wealth,” enter “1887” in the “Initial Year” field, “50” in the “Initial 
Amount” field, and “2015” in the “Desired Year” field; subsequently, using the same dates, enter 
“300” in the “Initial Amount” field). 
 64.  Williams, 251 U.S. at 64. 
 65.  115 U.S. 512, 523 (1885). 
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the suit of the public, and what disposition shall be made of the amounts 
collected, are merely matters of legislative discretion,66 
and adding further, 
[n]or does giving the penalty to the aggrieved passenger require that it 
be confined or proportioned to his loss or damages; for, as it is imposed 
as a punishment for the violation of a public law, the Legislature may 
adjust its amount to the public wrong rather than the private injury, just 
as if it were going to the state.67 
Modern consumer protection statutes that use statutory damages as 
part of their enforcement mechanisms include the federal Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).68  For violations of the FDCPA’s 
regulation of debt collectors, plaintiffs are entitled to as much as $1,000 
for a violation.69  To avoid the Chuck E. Cheese problem, FDCPA 
provides that in class actions plaintiffs may only recover the lesser of 
$500,000 or one percent of defendant’s net worth.70  Statutory damages 
may be recovered whether or not actual damages exist.71  Punitive 
damages, however, are not recoverable.72  The amount of statutory 
damages is discretionary with the court, based upon factors listed in the 
statute: (1) the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt 
collector, (2) the nature of the noncompliance, and (3) the extent to which 
the noncompliance was intentional.73  This last factor, the extent to which 
noncompliance was intentional, makes it clear that statutory damages can 
be awarded even for unintentional violations.  Courts have limited the 
effectiveness of the statute in the individual action context, however, by 
construing it to authorize a maximum of $1000 damages per action, 
regardless of the number of violations proved,74 making it less likely that 
plaintiffs will bring individual lawsuits under the act.  In the case of class 
action lawsuits, the statute directs the court to consider the same three 
factors, in addition to the resources of the debt collector and the number 
                                                          
 66.  Williams, 251 U.S. at 66. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Pub. L. 95-109; 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p 
(2012)). 
 69.  15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A). 
 70.  Id. § 1692k(a)(2)(B). 
 71.  See Baker v. G.C. Services Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 72.  See Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 73.  15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1) (2012). 
 74.  See, e.g., Wright v. Fin. Serv. of Norwalk, Inc., 22 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 1994); Harper v. 
Better Bus. Servs., Inc., 961 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir. 1992). 
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of persons adversely affected by the debt collector’s conduct.75  In either 
type of case, the court has the discretion to award no statutory damages, 
again regardless of the number of violations proved.76 
A similar enforcement regime is established by the federal Electronic 
Fund Transfer Act of 1978 (“EFTA”),77 which defines the rights, 
liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in electronic fund transfer 
systems.  One of its stated objectives is the protection of consumer rights.78  
Pursuant to this goal, the statute authorizes statutory damages in individual 
actions in “an amount not less than $100 nor greater than $1,000.”79  In the 
case of a class action, however, awards are to be made in the court’s 
discretion: 
except that (i) as to each member of the class no minimum recovery shall 
be applicable, and (ii) the total recovery . . . in any class action or series 
of class actions arising out of the same failure to comply by the same 
person shall not be more than the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of 
the net worth of the defendant.80 
Like the FDCPA, therefore, the EFTA avoids the Chuck E. Cheese 
problem. 
In both individual and class actions, the EFTA provides an unusual 
degree of guidance to the court making the award, instructing it to 
consider: 
(1) in any individual action under subsection (a)(2)(A) [of this section], 
the frequency and persistence of noncompliance, the nature of such 
noncompliance, and the extent to which the noncompliance was 
intentional; or (2) in any class action under subsection (a)(2)(B) [of this 
section], the frequency and persistence of noncompliance, the nature of 
such noncompliance, the resources of the defendant, the number of 
persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the noncompliance 
was intentional.81 
Under § 1640(a) of the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”),82 
plaintiff is entitled to recover 
                                                          
 75.  15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(2). 
 76.  See Emanuel v. Am. Credit Exch., 870 F.2d 805, 809 (2nd Cir. 1989). 
 77.  Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 78.  15 U.S.C. § 1693(b) (2012). 
 79.  Id. § 1693m(a)(2)(A). 
 80.  Id. § 1693m(a)(2)(B). 
 81.  Id. § 1693m(b). 
 82.  15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2012). 
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the sum of (1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of 
the failure; (2) [statutory damages ranging from twice the amount of any 
finance charge in connection with the transaction to $5,000, depending 
on circumstances]; (3) . . . the costs of the action, together with a 
reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court; and (4) in [a limited 
subset of cases], an amount equal to the sum of all finance charges and 
fees paid by the consumer, unless the creditor demonstrates that the 
failure to comply is not material.83 
Like the FDCPA and the EFTA, the TILA alters these rules for class 
actions, providing 
except that as to each member of the class no minimum recovery shall 
be applicable, and the total recovery under this subparagraph in any class 
action or series of class actions arising out of the same failure to comply 
by the same creditor shall not be more than the lesser of $1,000,000 or 1 
per centum of the net worth of the creditor.84 
Congress has also used statutory damages to enforce the odometer 
provisions of the federal Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings 
Act.85  The Act prohibits tampering with odometers on motor vehicles and 
establishes safeguards for the protection of persons who purchase vehicles 
with altered or reset odometers.86  It provides further that a person who 
violates its provisions with the intention to defraud is liable for three times 
actual damages or $10,000, whichever is greater.87 
The corresponding Ohio statute, the Ohio Odometer Rollback and 
Disclosure Act,88 similarly prohibits tampering with motor vehicle 
odometers and adds state law safeguards to protect purchasers of motor 
vehicles with altered or reset odometers.89  Damages available under the 
Ohio law equal “three times the amount of actual damages sustained or 
fifteen hundred dollars, whichever is greater.”90  Why Ohio needs state 
rules to this effect, given the federal statute, is unclear.  The state rules 
might more conveniently allow enforcement in small claims court but for 
                                                          
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. § 1640(a)(2)(B). 
 85.  Pub. L. No. 92-513, 86 Stat. 947 (odometer requirements now codified as amended in 49 
U.S.C. §§ 32701–32711 (2012)). 
 86.  49 U.S.C. § 32701(b) (2012). 
 87.   Id. § 32710(a). 
 88.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4549.41–52 (West 2008).  See also George L. Blum, Annotation, 
Validity, Construction and Application of State Laws Concerning, Relating to, or Encompassing 
Disclosure of and Tampering with Motor Vehicle Odometer—Validity of Statutory Provisions, 
Construction of Statute and Particular Terms, and Remedies, 66 A.L.R. 6th 351 (2011). 
 89.  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4549.42 (West 2008). 
 90.  Id. § 4549.49(A)(1). 
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the fact that Ohio’s small claims division lacks jurisdiction to award 
“punitive or exemplary damages.”91  Whether statutory damages fall 
within either category is unclear. 
In the real estate context, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
of 197492 protects consumers from unreasonably high settlement charges 
in real estate transactions.93  In the case of a pattern or practice of 
noncompliance with the Act’s requirements with respect to servicing of 
mortgage loans and administration of escrow accounts, violators are liable 
for actual damages plus any additional damages, as the court may allow, 
in an amount not to exceed $2,000.94  In this context, statutory damages 
are only authorized in the case of a pattern or practice of violations;95 in 
effect, this act, unlike most others, requires persistent bad behavior before 
statutory damages can be awarded. 
Statutory damages provisions also commonly appear in state rules 
governing the return of security deposits to tenants.  In California, for 
example, if a landlord fails in bad faith to return a deposit, the tenant may 
recover up to $200 in addition to actual damages.96  In Georgia, any 
landlord who wrongfully retains a security deposit in violation of 
statutorily required procedures designed to prevent landlords from doing 
so is liable for up to three times the amount improperly withheld plus 
attorney’s fees.97 
Hawaii’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act provides that any 
health-care provider or institution that intentionally violates the Act’s 
health-care decision-making rules will be liable for “damages of $500 or 
actual damages resulting from the violation, whichever is greater, plus 
reasonable attorney’s fees.”98  In addition, any person who intentionally 
and fraudulently changes an individual’s advance health-care directive is 
liable “for damages of $2,500 or [any] actual damages resulting from the 
action, [again] whichever is greater, plus reasonable attorney’s fees.”99 
                                                          
 91.  Id. § 1925.02(A)(2)(a)(iii) (West 2005 & Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.). 
 92.  Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617). 
 93.  12 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012). 
 94.  Id. § 2605(f)(1).  Note, however, that a single violation of RESPA is not a “pattern or 
practice” of violations, as basis for statutory damages under RESPA. In re Tomasevic, 273 B.R. 682, 
686–87 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002).  In class actions, additional damages are limited to the lesser of one 
million dollars or one percent of the net worth of the defendant.  Id. § 2605(f)(2). 
 95.  Id. § 2605(f). 
 96.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1950.7(f) (West 2010). 
 97.  GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-35(c) (West 2003). 
 98.  HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-10(a) (West 2008). 
 99.  Id. § 327E-10(b) (West 2008). 
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The federal Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act 
of 1983 (“MSAWPA”)100 was enacted to improve the working conditions 
of migrant workers.101  Congress evidently believed that providing for 
statutory damages would help to promote enforcement, deter violations, 
and more likely compensate farm workers for their injuries.102  The Act 
therefore provides for statutory damages of up to $500 per plaintiff per 
violation.103  Multiple infractions of the same provision, however, only 
constitute a single violation.104  If a class action is certified then the 
maximum permitted award is the lesser of $500 per plaintiff per violation 
and $500,000 total.105  The court is specifically “authorized to consider 
whether an attempt was made to resolve the issues in dispute before the 
resort to litigation.”106  In setting the amount of such awards, courts have 
looked at, among other things, the total award requested, the nature of the 
violation, and amounts other courts have awarded in similar cases.107  As 
a result, in enforcing the MSAWPA, courts have attempted to maintain 
consistency across cases, to treat awards made in other cases as having, in 
effect, precedential value with respect to amount.  Consistency is 
facilitated by the fact that many cases under the MSAWPA are not tried 
before a jury.108 
C. Rules for the Protection and Dissemination of Information 
Statutory damages have also been invoked to enforce rules for the 
protection and dissemination of information.  In the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,109 for example, Congress authorized 
statutory damages for any person whose wire, oral or electronic 
                                                          
 100.  29 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1872 (2012 & Supp. 2016); Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, 
Construction and Application of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act 
(AWPA)—General Provisions Subchapter (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1851 to 1872), 65 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 339 
(2012). 
 101.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012).  The state of Washington has a similar statute. See Farm Labor 
Contractors Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.30.010–902 (West 2005 & Supp. 2014). 
 102.  Catalano, supra note 100. 
 103.  29 U.S.C. § 1854(c)(1) (2012). 
 104.  Id. § 1854(c)(1)(A). 
 105.  Id. § 1854(c)(1)(B). 
 106.  Id. § 1854(c)(2). 
 107.  Catalano, supra note 100. 
 108.  See id. (describing most claims under the MSAWPA as equitable). 
 109.  Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197; see also Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, 
Construction and Application of Provision of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 
(18 U.S.C.A. § 2520) Authorizing Civil Cause of Action by Person Whose Wire, Oral, or Electronic 
Communication Is Intercepted, Disclosed, or Used in Violation of Act, 164 A.L.R. Fed. 139 (2000). 
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communications are unlawfully intercepted, disclosed, or used.110  
Damages under the Act are scaled to the severity of the offense.  A first 
offense of privately viewing a non-encrypted video or radio 
communication not for an illegal purpose and not for commercial 
advantage only triggers statutory damages of between $50 and $500.111 
For a repeat offender, still not for an illegal purpose and not for 
commercial advantage, damages rise to between $100 and $1,000.112  If 
the offender has an illegal purpose or obtains a commercial advantage, 
however, damages become more severe; the court may award either (1) 
the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits 
made by the violator as a result of the violation or (2) statutory damages 
equal to the greater of $100 per day of violation or $10,000 total.113 
The Tennessee Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act114 
similarly provides that any person whose wire, oral or electronic 
communication is intentionally intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation 
of the Act may recover the greater of (1) actual damages or (2) statutory 
damages of $100 per day of violation or $10,000, whichever is greater.115 
The federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
(“ECPA”) extended the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act’s 
anti-wiretapping rules to computer and other digital and electronic 
communications.116  If a violator had not been previously enjoined or 
found liable in a prior civil action under the ECPA, a plaintiff may recover 
“the greater of the sum of actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, or 
statutory damages of not less than $50 and not more than $500.”117  If a 
defendant had previously been enjoined or found liable, a plaintiff may 
recovery “the greater of the sum of actual damages suffered by the 
plaintiff, or statutory damages of not less than $100 and not more than 
$1000.”118  The legislative history of the act suggests that this language 
was intended to authorize statutory damages even in the absence of actual 
damages.119 
                                                          
 110.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2012). 
 111.  Id. § 2520(c)(1)(A). 
 112.  See id. § 2520(c)(1)(B). 
 113.  See id. § 2520(c)(2). 
 114.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-601 (West 2011). 
 115.   Id. § 39-13-603. 
 116.  See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 
(2012 & Supp. 2016); see also Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), JUSTICE 
INFORMATION SHARING (July 30, 2013), https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1285. 
 117.  18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(1)(A). 
 118.  Id. § 2520(c)(1)(B). 
 119.  S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 7 (1986).  
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The federal Privacy Act of 1974 prescribes a code of fair information 
practices for federal agencies in the collection, storage, and dissemination 
of personal information.120  An individual harmed by an agency’s violation 
of the Act’s requirements may bring a civil action for damages against the 
agency.  If an agency intentionally or willfully fails to maintain accurate 
records or fails to protect personal information in a way that has adverse 
effects on an individual, it is liable for actual damages “but in no case shall 
a person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000,”121 
language nearly identical to that in the Stored Communications Act.  As 
has been noted, however, in Doe v. Chao,122 the Supreme Court construed 
this language to limit statutory damages to plaintiffs who could prove at 
least some actual damages, holding that the legislative history of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act was irrelevant to construction of 
the Privacy Act.123  Doe has led to widespread confusion in the lower 
courts.124 
With respect to records improperly maintained by state agencies, the 
California Information Practices Act125 provides that a successful plaintiff 
shall recover, in addition to any special or general damages, a minimum 
of $2500 in what it terms “exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees 
and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in the suit.”126  California 
law thus provides for more than double the amount of statutory damages 
as federal law does and is explicit about the noncompensatory purpose of 
those damages. 
On the flip side, Ohio, like many jurisdictions, requires public offices 
to provide public records upon request.127  In Ohio, however, if a request 
is made and not complied with, the statutory damages are set at $100 per 
day from the date of filing a mandamus action, up to a maximum of 
$1000.128  The law recites that the “award of statutory damages shall not 
be construed as a penalty, but as compensation for injury arising from lost 
use of the requested information.  The existence of this injury shall be 
conclusively presumed.”129 
                                                          
 120.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012 & Supp. 2016). 
 121.  Id. § 552a(g)(4)(A). 
 122.  540 U.S. 614 (2004). 
 123.  Id. at 626–27. 
 124.  See supra notes 26–35 and accompanying text. 
 125.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798 (West 2009 & Supp. 2014). 
 126.  Id. § 1798.53 (West 2009). 
 127.  Availability of Public Records, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43(B)(1) (West 2013, Westlaw 
through 2016 Legis. Sess.). 
 128.  Id. § 149.43(C)(2). 
 129.  Id. 
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D. Civil Rights Rules 
Damages for violation of a plaintiff’s civil rights present a further 
problem in the measurement of damages.  Someone whose civil rights are 
violated may suffer economic or emotional harm.  But even if she does 
not, she and all those with the same protected characteristics suffer 
dignitary injury.  One excluded from a nightclub because of her race has 
been injured—and core American values have been offended—even if an 
A-list nightclub then admits her and she is not distressed by her initial 
exclusion at all. 
Unlike federal civil rights law, California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act 
(“Unruh Act”)130 therefore authorizes damages as a remedy for 
discrimination by businesses “up to a maximum of three times the amount 
of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000), 
and any attorney’s fees.”131  Thus, in California, a victim of discrimination 
is entitled to $4000 in statutory damages even if she suffers no actual 
economic or emotional harm. 
A comparison of the Unruh Act with the federal Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”)132 illustrates how statutory damages can 
enhance civil rights enforcement.  The ADA declares that disabled 
individuals are entitled to the full benefit and access to the goods, services, 
and privileges of public accommodations.133  Title III of the ADA requires 
places of public accommodation (including most private businesses that 
are open to the public) to remove physical barriers to access—steps, heavy 
doors, and narrow aisles—or to provide alternate means of access.134  It 
does not, however, provide for statutory damages.  Since it is not always 
the case that persons discriminated against in violation of the ADA suffer 
demonstrable actual damages, the ADA does not always protect their 
dignitary interests; nor does it give persons who have been discriminated 
against any economic incentive to assist in the enforcement of the act.  By 
contrast, the Unruh Act, which is construed to incorporate the ADA’s 
substantive requirements, authorizes an award of up to three times the 
amount of actual damages, but in no case less than $4000, against 
businesses who do not meet those requirements.135  Thus, in California, a 
                                                          
 130.  Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51, 52 (West 2007, Supp. 2014, & Westlaw 
through Ch. 859 of 2017 Regulatory Sess.) (enacted 1959). 
 131.  Id. at § 52(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 859 of 2017 Regulatory Sess.). 
 132.  Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 133.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012). 
 134.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12183 (2012). 
 135.  CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51(f), 52(a).  California does impose limitations on recoveries in access 
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plaintiff who has been subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability 
has greater recourse, and greater incentive to ensure that businesses 
comply with the law, than similarly situated plaintiffs in other states.136 
Another statute sometimes thought to fall within the civil rights 
category is the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act 
(FACE).137  FACE authorizes criminal and civil remedies for violent, 
threatening, obstructive, and destructive conduct intended to injure, 
intimidate, or interfere with persons seeking to obtain or provide 
reproductive health services.138  The damages provision states that a court 
may award any appropriate relief including compensatory and punitive 
damages.139  “With respect to compensatory damages, the plaintiff may 
elect, at any time prior to the rendering of final judgment, to recover, in 
lieu of actual damages, an award of statutory damages in the amount of 
$5,000 per violation.”140 
                                                          
discrimination cases.  A defendant’s liability for statutory damages in a construction-related 
accessibility claim against a place of public accommodation is reduced to a minimum of one thousand 
dollars ($1000) for each offense if the defendant demonstrates that it has corrected all construction-
related violations that form the basis of the claim within sixty days of being served with the complaint.  
CAL. CIV. CODE § 55.56(g)(1) (West Supp. 2014 & Westlaw through Ch. 859 of 2017 Regulatory 
Sess.).  Also, a defendant’s liability for statutory damages in a construction-related accessibility claim 
against a place of public accommodation is reduced to a minimum of two thousand dollars ($2000) 
for each offense.  Id. § 55.56(g)(2). 
Recent changes to California procedure further limit the availability of statutory damages in 
construction-related accessibility claims.  Attorneys who serve a demand or complaint on a violator 
must also serve a separate advisory notice.  Id. § 55.54(a)(1).  If the defendant qualifies for a stay and 
early evaluation conference, the court may stay the proceedings for ninety days unless the plaintiff has 
already obtained temporary injunctive relief.  Id. § 55.54(d)(1).  The court must also schedule a 
mandatory early evaluation conference for a date no later than seventy days after it issues the order.  
Id. § 55.54(d)(2).  The defendant must file a copy of the Certified Access Specialist (CAS) inspection 
at least fifteen days before the conference.  Id. § 55.54(d)(4)(A).  In that same time-frame, the plaintiff 
must file and serve a list of the specific violations on the defendant’s property, the amount of damages 
that the plaintiff is requesting, and the current amount of attorney’s fees and costs.  Id. § 
55.54(d)(7)(A)–(C).  The court may lift or extend the stay upon a showing of good cause by either 
party, and the CAS report is not binding on the court.  Id. § 55.54(e), (j).  When determining how 
much to award in attorney’s fees, a court may consider any settlement offers a party made or rejected.  
CAL. CIV. CODE § 55.55 (West Supp. 2014).  Otherwise, settlement offers are generally inadmissible 
under the Evidence Code.  Id.  The plaintiff can only recover attorney’s fees if she personally 
encountered the violation on the defendant’s property or if the defendant’s violation deterred the 
plaintiff from using the defendant’s property.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 55.56(b) (West Supp. 2014). 
 136.  Part of California’s Disabled Persons Act, which antedated enforcement of the ADA through 
the Unruh Act, provided (and continues to provide) for $1,000 statutory damages or up to three times 
actual damages.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 54.3(a) (West 2007). 
 137.  18 U.S.C. § 248 (2012) (enacted 1994); see also Heather J. Blum-Redlich, Annotation, 
Validity, Construction, and Application of Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE) (18 
U.S.C.A. § 248), 134 A.L.R. Fed. 507 (1996). 
 138.  18 U.S.C. § 248. 
 139.  Id. § 248(c)(1)(B). 
 140.  Id. 
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E. Other Statutory Damage Provisions 
The use of statutory damages is not limited to the four categories 
explored above. 
We have already noted the Tennessee statute that authorizes up to 
$5,000 in statutory damages for the death of a pet from the person who 
caused that death or the injuries that led to that death.141  A pet owner’s 
subjective damages from the killing of her pet may be large even if her 
objective damages are minimal or negative.  The Tennessee statute, in 
effect, deviates from classic common law damage principles142 to 
compensate the owner for what may be a devastating subjective loss.  
Illinois law includes a similar provision, but for ostensibly 
noncompensatory reasons, authorizing an award of between $500 and 
$25,000 in punitive or exemplary damages for each act of abuse or neglect 
in addition to compensation for the owner’s actual economic and 
emotional damages, plus attorneys’ fees.143 
Unlawfully destroying a tree may similarly not reduce the fair market 
value of the property in question, the standard common law measure of 
damages for wrongful destruction of ornamental trees.144  Indeed, one 
could imagine circumstances in which doing so would increase the 
property’s value.  A tort recovery limited to economic loss might therefore 
afford the owner no or little recompense.  New York solves this problem 
by authorizing statutory damages for the cutting, removing, injuring or 
destroying trees.145  Even if defendant incorrectly believed she had the 
right to take such actions, she is still liable for the fair market value of the 
trees, $250 per tree, or both.146  Plaintiff’s damages may also include costs 
of litigation and reparation of the land.147  Reparation, especially if the 
destroyed tree was mature, can be expensive.148 
                                                          
 141.  See TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(a)(1) (West 2010). 
 142.  See 4 AM. JUR. 2D Animals § 117 (2017) (“Dogs are classified as personal property for 
damage purposes, not as persons, extensions of their owners, or any other legal entity whose loss 
would ordinarily give rise to personal injury damages.  Thus, the general rules [sic] is that the measure 
of damages for the destruction of personal property is the fair market value thereof at the time of the 
destruction.”) (footnote omitted). 
 143.  510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70 / 16.3 (West 2014). 
 144.  See Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Measure of Damages for Injury to or Destruction 
of Shade or Ornamental Tree or Shrub, 95 A.L.R.3d 508 (1979) (noting that “ordinarily the measure 
of damages is the resulting depreciation in the value of the land on which the trees or shrubs stood”). 
 145.  N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 861 (McKinney 2009), Vanderwerken v. Bellinger, 900 
N.Y.S.2d 170, 172–73 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). 
 146.  N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 861(2). 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Tree Planting Costs, HOWMUCH, https://howmuch.net/costs/tree-install (last visited Jan. 20, 
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Finally, in Oregon, a person who receives a dishonored check may 
recover from the maker statutory damages in an amount equal to $100 or 
triple the amount for which the check is drawn, whichever is greater.149  
Such damages are to be awarded in addition to the amount for which the 
check was drawn, but may not be more than $500 over the amount for 
which the check was drawn.150  Here, statutory damages are presumably 
used both to deter wrongful conduct and to compensate the victim for the 
difficult-to-prove inconveniences, neither economic nor in the nature of 
classic emotional distress, inherent in having to deal with a bounced check. 
The statutory provisions described in this Part II constitute but a few 
illustrative examples of the use and structure of statutory damage 
provisions in state and federal law.  They should, however, be sufficient 
to permit an informed exploration, to which we now turn, of the kinds of 
problems that lead legislatures to enact such provisions and the kinds of 
problems they can in turn create. 
III.  PURPOSES 
The justifications legislatures, courts, and commentators have offered 
for statutory damages fall into three broad categories. 
The first is remedial.  Quintessentially, it is asserted that damages in 
the area in question, although real, are unusually hard to prove; statutory 
damages are set so as to approximate likely actual damages without 
requiring proof of such damages.  It is also sometimes asserted that, for 
whatever reasons, ordinary common law damage rules are inadequate in 
particular contexts.  In some situations, for example, a subjective loss rule 
may better accord with justice; since subjective losses are hard to establish 
with certainty, statutory damages may do a better job in the circumstances.  
It may also turn out that failure to provide for damages in excess of 
plaintiff’s actual damages can unjustly enrich the wrongdoer; statutory 
damages can solve this problem as well. 
A second set of justifications derives from criminal law theory.  
Statutory damages may deter behaviors that we seek to reduce.  They may 
punish, regardless of whether they have any deterrent effect.  In any event, 
they may serve an expressive function, declaring to the wrongdoer and the 
world society’s disapproval of his actions. 
Thirdly, statutory damages may alter the procedures and incentives to 
litigate that might otherwise pertain.  Provision of statutory damages in 
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 149.  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.701(1) (West 2013). 
 150.  Id. 
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lieu of actual damages may reduce or eliminate the cost of proving actual 
damages.  Together with the increased litigation yields that statutory 
damages also authorize, this encourages litigation.  In effect, statutory 
damages reflect a legislative intuition that more litigation of the type 
involved is better—that leaving the ordinary rules of civil litigation in 
place would result in too few lawsuits.  Thus, statutory damage rules are 
commonly designed to make it possible for individual plaintiffs to bring 
cases they might otherwise not bring.  They explicitly encourage private 
attorneys general to sue to vindicate the public interest.  They may even 
substitute for criminal prosecution (without, of course, affording 
defendants the procedural protections to which they would otherwise be 
entitled in criminal court); many violations that trigger statutory damages 
are also crimes. 
A.  Remedial Purposes 
The first and perhaps most important set of justifications for statutory 
damages is remedial—to better place each party in the position she would 
have been in in the absence of the violation.  Statutory damages are, after 
all, part of the civil, not criminal, law; and the civil law’s core purpose is 
remedial. 
1.  Compensation 
a.  Difficulties of proof 
It is often claimed that statutory damages are authorized to allow 
recovery where it might otherwise be difficult or impossible to prove the 
existence or amount of plaintiff’s actual damages, notwithstanding the fact 
that we intuit that plaintiff has suffered some amount of such damages.  
Senator Orrin Hatch, for example, has testified before Congress that 
“Section 504(c) of the Copyright Act provides for the award of statutory 
damages at the plaintiff’s election in order to provide greater security for 
copyright owners, who often find it difficult to prove actual damages in 
infringement cases—particularly in the electronic environment.”151  In 
particular, it is asserted that in copyright cases it is often difficult to prove 
                                                          
 151.  145 CONG. REC. S7453 (daily ed. June 22, 1999) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (The Senator 
went on to introduce a bill that increased the Copyright Act’s statutory damage amounts, explaining 
that the then-current amounts were inadequate to achieve their aims given the “combination of more 
than a decade of inflation and revolutionary changes in technology.”  Id.). 
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the amount of profits plaintiff would have made had the infringement not 
occurred.152 
Copyright was originally about preventing business competitors from 
taking business away from the copyright owner by publishing a work to 
which plaintiff had exclusive rights.  Senator Hatch’s difficulty-of-proof 
rationale is plausible in such a context, although it may not warrant “an 
award that is ‘more money than the entire music recording industry has 
made since Edison’s invention of the phonograph in 1877,’” as the 
Copyright Act apparently authorized in Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group 
LLC.153  Today, however, many of the most salient copyright cases are 
brought instead against individuals making copies for personal use.154  
Unless defendant retransmits to others (a separate copyright violation), 
actual damages in such cases are easy to calculate: defendant has been 
deprived of the price defendant should have paid—for a song or movie 
often less than $1 and rarely more than $20.  The argument that plaintiff’s 
damages from personal use downloading are more difficult to prove than 
if defendant had shoplifted the corresponding CD or DVD from a store is 
not credible.  By failing to distinguish between business competitor cases 
and personal downloading cases, Congress has authorized a series of 
stunningly large awards in the latter category that sometimes seem to call 
the legitimacy of copyright law itself into question—at least within the 
demographic most likely to engage in the behavior sought to be deterred. 
By contrast, the difficulty-of-proof rationale is more plausible in 
trademark cases under the Lanham Act.155  In Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. 
v. LY USA, high-end fashion designer Louis Vuitton asserted that the 
defendants’ “willful, extensive, repeated and systematic counterfeiting of 
Louis Vuitton’s valuable trademarks” warranted the maximum authorized 
statutory damage award.156  The court awarded Louis Vuitton over three 
million dollars, observing that “[i]n enacting the statutory damages 
provision of the Lanham Act, Congress found, generally, that 
‘counterfeiters’ records are nonexistent, inadequate or deceptively kept in 
order to willfully deflate the level of counterfeiting activity actually 
                                                          
 152.  Jonathan Bailey, The Difference Between Fines and Damages, PLAGIARISMTODAY  
(Aug. 28, 2009), https://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2009/08/28/the-difference-between-fines-and-
damages/. 
 153.  784 F. Supp. 2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Def. Mem. at 2–3) (criticizing requested 
statutory damage award of over $1.5 billion). 
 154.  See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn. 2010), 
vacated, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 155.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2012). 
 156.  No. 06 CIV. 13463(AKH), 2008 WL 5637161, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2008). 
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engaged in, making proving actual damages in these cases extremely 
difficult if not impossible.’”157 
In business regulation cases, whether the difficulty-of-proof rationale 
is plausible varies from wrong to wrong.  In railroad overcharge cases, for 
example, computation of plaintiff’s actual loss is trivial—except in very 
unusual cases, it is simply the amount of the overcharge.  By contrast, the 
inconvenience and distress consumers suffer when debt collectors violate 
the fair debt collection practice rules158 or the economic losses borrowers 
suffer when lenders violate the Truth in Lending Act159 by failing to 
disclose credit terms may be extremely difficult to prove or quantify. 
Privacy, information disclosure, and civil rights cases often present 
similarly forbidding difficulty-of-proof problems.  In many cases, the only 
conventional damages may arguably be for emotional distress—and even 
there it is generally unlikely that plaintiffs will suffer the kind of serious 
emotional harm for which compensation is normally awarded.  Experience 
suggests, moreover, that in the absence of physical harm finders of fact are 
often reluctant to award emotional distress damages at all.  A typical 
response to such claims in actions for discrimination is that of the Illinois 
Human Rights Commission: “awards for emotional distress are very much 
the exception, not the rule.”160  The same is true in privacy cases: 
It is difficult . . . to calculate the damage suffered from the portrayal of 
someone in a false light or the intrusion into a person’s seclusion.  This 
is because the damages do not flow from a tangible loss.  This is to be 
contrasted, for example, from the losses suffered in a car accident such 
as medical expenses and loss of income, which are tangible.161 
Statutory damage awards that reasonably approximate plaintiffs’ likely 
actual, albeit unconventional, injuries solve these problems. 
b.  Adjustments to common law damage principles 
Statutory damages are also sometimes used when common law 
damage principles fail to capture what the legislature believes to be 
plaintiff’s true loss.  The classic common law, for example, did not 
generally protect the kinds of dignitary interests implicated in civil rights 
                                                          
 157.  Id. (quoting Polo Ralph Lauren, L.P. v. 3M Trading Co., No. 97 Civ. 4824(JSM)(MH), 1999 
WL 33740332, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1999)). 
 158.  15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (2012). 
 159.  15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 160.  In re Donna Davenport, No. 1987SF0429, 1998 WL 937869, at *5 (Ill. Hum. Rts. Com. Nov. 
20, 1998). 
 161.  Mac Cabal, Note, California to the Rescue: A Contrasting View of Minimum Statutory 
Damages in Privacy Torts, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 273, 276–77 (2007). 
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cases.  The statutory damages authorized by California’s Unruh Civil 
Rights Act solve this problem, at least in California. 
2.  Unjust Enrichment 
Finally, statutory damages rules make available an alternative to the 
equitable remedy of disgorgement in cases involving unjust enrichment of 
the wrongdoer.  Where a copyright violator earns more profits than the 
owner would have earned, for example, merely giving the owner damages 
in the amount of his lost profits will still leave the wrongdoer in a better 
position than if he had never committed the wrong.  The flexibility to 
award statutory damages under the Copyright Act allows courts to prevent 
such results.  The same is true in trademark cases.  Whether it is true in 
other contexts will depend on the facts. 
Although unjust enrichment is sometimes cited as a justification for 
statutory damages, such provisions are not required to remedy that 
particular wrong.  Recoveries to remedy unjust enrichment are generally 
available even in the absence of statutory damage rules.  What statutory 
damages do allow, however, is for a court to order recoupment of the 
wrongdoer’s hypothetical profits without proof of the amount of such 
profits, presumably because of the difficulties of tendering such proof.  
Whether this is appropriate will depend on the circumstances. 
B.  Substitutes for Criminal Enforcement 
To the extent statutory damages cannot be justified as approximating 
likely actual damages or preventing unjust enrichment, they are often 
justified as substitutes for criminal penalties.  Recall the Supreme Court’s 
defense in St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. 
Williams,162 of the statutory damages awarded by Arkansas for railroad 
overcharges: 
[T]he power of the State to impose fines and penalties for a violation of 
its statutory requirements is coeval with government; and the mode in 
which they shall be enforced, whether at the suit of a private party, or at 
the suit of the public, and what disposition shall be made of the amounts 
collected, are merely matters of legislative discretion.163 
Modern criminal theory harbors an unresolved tension between 
punishment as retribution and punishment as deterrence.  Punishment as 
                                                          
 162.  251 U.S. 63 (1919). 
 163.  Id. at 66 (quoting Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 523 (1885)). 
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retribution requires proportionality—that the punishment fit the crime.  If 
statutory damages under the Copyright Act cannot be justified as remedial 
and must instead be justified as quasi-criminal penalties, they become 
difficult to defend under retributive theory.  It is hard to characterize a 
$1.92 million penalty as proportionate to the wrong of downloading 
twenty-four songs without paying for them.164 
Our current system of statutory damages for copyright violations is 
therefore more easily defended on a utilitarian basis, by reference to its 
ostensible deterrent effects.  As Senator Orrin Hatch testified, today’s 
sometime extreme statutory damages for copyright violations “provide 
greater deterrence for would-be infringers.”165  The Supreme Court in W. 
F. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc.166 similarly held that 
statutory damages for copyright infringement are not only “restitution of 
profit and reparation for injury,” but also are in the nature of a penalty 
“designed to discourage wrongful conduct.”167  Extreme penalties for 
deterrence purposes are harder to justify, however, if they have no 
demonstrable deterrent effect or if one believes that all punishment must 
have at least some retributive justification. 
C.  Procedural Purposes 
As remedial provisions, statutory damages attempt to place each party 
in the position she would have been in in the absence of the violation.  As 
substitutes for criminal enforcement, they focus on the behavior of 
potential or actual wrongdoers, punishing, deterring, or both.  A third 
general category of justifications focuses on statutory damages’ 
procedural effects—their effects on the behavior of potential or actual 
litigants, and on the course of the litigation itself. 
1.  Encouraging litigation 
Statutory damages almost always result in higher litigation returns at 
lower cost to plaintiffs.  They typically reduce or eliminate the cost of 
proving actual damages and almost always increase plaintiff’s recovery.  
Thus, statutory damages commonly reflect a legislative determination, 
explicit or implicit, that more litigation of the type involved would be 
                                                          
 164.  Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn. 2010), vacated, 
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better—that leaving the ordinary rules of civil litigation in place would 
result in too few lawsuits. 
Statutory damage rules are therefore generally structured so as to 
enable individual plaintiffs to bring cases they might otherwise not bring.  
In the realm of consumer protection, for example, “[s]tatutory damages 
were meant to provide an individual plaintiff with the ability to bring a 
lawsuit when the anticipated damages are otherwise too low to provide an 
attorney with adequate incentive to take a case.”168  In this regard, statutory 
damages are not unique; other techniques used to encourage lawsuits that 
might otherwise not be worth bringing include treble damages, punitive 
damages, attorneys’ fees, and class actions.169  As the sampling of statutory 
damage provisions in Part II illustrates, many legislative regimes that 
authorize statutory damages also authorize treble or punitive damages and 
the recovery of attorneys’ fees, all to enable individual plaintiffs to bring 
cases they might otherwise not bring.  Such remedies are commonly 
provided even in the absence of any actual harm. 
For example, disclosure violations under the Truth in Lending Act 
usually do not involve actual damages.170  To make lawsuits economically 
worthwhile and encourage private enforcement of the Act, therefore, 
Congress authorizes the award of statutory damages in addition to any 
actual damages for violations of that Act.171  In Edwards v. Your Credit 
Inc.,172 the Fifth Circuit held that statutory damages must be imposed for 
violations of the Act, regardless of the district court’s finding that no actual 
damages had resulted from defendant’s violations.173  In Perrone v. 
General Motors Acceptance Corp.,174 the same court opined that 
“statutory damages [under TILA] are reserved for cases in which the 
damages caused by a violation are small or difficult to ascertain.”175  
Similarly, in the Chuck E. Cheese litigation, plaintiff herself admitted that 
                                                          
 168.  Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer Protection 
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neither she nor the class she represented had suffered any economic 
harm.176 
Another way legislatures and courts sometimes articulate the same 
justification is to note that statutory damages are intended to encourage 
policing of the act in question by private attorneys general.  Federal, state, 
and local enforcement agencies, civil or criminal, are often not equipped 
to identify and prosecute all potential violations of statutes within their 
jurisdiction.  Statutory damages recruit private parties to fill this gap.  
Nearly every state, for example, has now extended to injured consumers 
the power to sue merchants who engage in deceptive practices.177  In 
Parker v. Time Warner Entertainment Co.,178 the Second Circuit 
acknowledged that the statutory damage provision of the Cable Privacy 
Act sought to “encourage the filing of individual lawsuits as a means of 
private enforcement of consumer protection laws.”179 
2.  Providing notice 
Some commentators have suggested that statutory damages perform 
the further procedural service of giving potential violators prior notice of 
the nature and severity of any damage awards they might face.180  Unlike 
other types of damages, “furnishing a defendant with ‘fair notice’ of the 
potential damages recoverable is . . . addressed by explicitly delineated 
statutory damage amounts.”181 
This asserted advantage seems largely illusory.  Most of us already 
have some intuitive sense of the magnitude of the liabilities or penalties 
we likely face if we break a lease, shoplift, or are found responsible for a 
car accident.  A defendant hit with a $1.92 million judgment for 
downloading twenty-four songs,182 by contrast, is almost certain to be 
surprised.  One suspects that the management of Chuck E. Cheese was 
stunned to learn that printing one extra digit on a receipt threatened 
corporate bankruptcy.183  How many clients ever instruct their lawyers to 
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compile lists of the statutory damage provisions to which they might be 
subject?  Without hiring a lawyer to compile such a list, how would any 
ordinary human being ever become aware of the obscure and sometimes 
counter-intuitive rules we have explored here? 
It is all very well to deem criminal defendants to have known the law.  
It is another matter entirely to pretend that the real world actually knows 
or cares about statutory damage rules until they are asserted in litigation. 
IV.  PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Our review of a sample of statutory damage provisions in Part II and 
of their purposes in Part III suggest at least three common problems.  First, 
unless special care is taken in drafting the statute, statutory damage awards 
are inherently ambiguous: it is almost always impossible to determine 
what part of a lump-sum award should be treated as an approximation of 
actual damages and what part as a substitute for the criminal law.  In 
writing statutory damage provisions, legislatures often invoke formulary 
language—for example, “an award of statutory damages . . . in a sum of 
not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just”—that 
fails to do anything to remedy this inherent ambiguity.  An irrational 
decision-making process known as “anchoring” may even cause such 
formulary language to make things worse.  Second, when combined with 
class certification, statutory damage awards often threaten results that 
cannot possibly have been within Congress’s contemplation.  Third, 
because they are not anchored to actual damages, even statutory damages 
awarded in individual cases can seem ridiculously large, given the 
underlying wrong they are supposed to remedy; it is unclear whether such 
awards are subject to constitutional limitations and, if so, which. 
A.  Ambiguity and the Rule of Law 
Many of the problems courts encounter in interpreting and applying 
statutory damages provisions are consequences of the fact that statutory 
damages are inherently ambiguous, serving multiple, often poorly defined, 
functions.  Legislatures commonly invoke statutory damages by enacting 
simple formulary language that fails to distinguish among those functions 
and specify how each such function might best be served.  When awards 
are set by general jury verdict, judicial review of that verdict for 
compliance with applicable legal standards becomes near-impossible; it is 
often unclear what standards, if any, should apply and how, mechanically, 
courts can even begin to administer them.  In consequence, statutory 
damage rules can produce wildly inconsistent awards in factually similar 
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cases, inconsistent interpretations of similar statutory provisions, and 
penalties completely out of proportion to the wrongs they are supposed to 
punish or deter.  This hardly seems consistent with the rule of law. 
The Copyright Act’s statutory damage provisions, among the most 
open-ended of any, illustrate these difficulties vividly.  Section 504(c)(1) 
and (2) provides, in pertinent part, that: 
[T]he copyright owner may elect . . . to recover, instead of actual 
damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements 
involved in the action, with respect to any one work, . . . in a sum of not 
less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just. . . . In a 
case where . . . infringement was committed willfully, the court in its 
discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not 
more than $150,000.184 
The italicized language is the sum total of Congress’s guidance to judges 
and juries: “as the court considers just.”  We should not be surprised to 
see verdicts for indistinguishable wrongs that differ by an order of 
magnitude and a requested award for “more money than the entire music 
recording industry has made since Edison’s invention of the phonograph 
in 1877.”185 
Part of the problem is the lack of a theory of statutory damages.  We 
will not presume to offer any such theory.  Based on our examination of a 
reasonably large sampling of statutory damages provisions in Part II and 
of their purposes in Part III, however, we can offer two general, and 
possibly useful, observations and a number of specific implementing 
suggestions.  Our goal in this Part IV.A is simply to help courts and 
legislatures disentangle the multiple functions of statutory damages, 
interpret or write statutory damage rules in a manner consistent with their 
intended functions, and implement such rules in a manner consistent with 
the rule of law. 
1.  Interpreting Statutory Damage Rules to Effectuate Their Purposes 
Premise 1: When legislatures enact statutory damage provisions, they 
have almost certainly concluded that the ordinary common law of damages 
is inadequate to their purposes.  To constrain statutory damage rules to 
common law principles without clear evidence that the legislature 
intended to do so, therefore, risks frustrating the legislature’s likely 
purposes.  The Doe v. Chao interpretation of the Privacy Act, for example, 
which limited statutory damages to plaintiffs able to prove actual damages, 
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applied a basic common law principle in a way that frustrated private 
enforcement of the Act in all but the most unusual circumstances.  Given 
the limited resources of government attorneys and the many competing 
demands on those resources, this means that the Privacy Act is unlikely to 
be enforced at all—except, again, in the most egregious circumstances.  
This was almost certainly not Congress’s intention. 
If courts accept this first premise, their first step in construing any 
statutory damage provision should be to ask why the legislature concluded 
that the common law of damages was likely to be inadequate in the 
circumstances.  Construing the statute in a manner consistent with 
plausible answers to this question is much more likely to effectuate the 
legislature’s purposes than either a common law interpretation (by 
hypothesis rejected by the legislature as inadequate) or a blind “plain 
language” approach. 
In so inquiring, courts may usefully ask why the legislature authorized 
statutory damages in the context in question but did not do so in roughly 
analogous circumstances.  Why, for example, did Tennessee authorize 
statutory damages for the killing of a dog, but not for the killing of a child?  
Why did Congress authorize statutory damages in copyright, but not in 
patent? 
The answer to the first question is both straightforward and useful: 
emotional distress damages for the killing of a child were already available 
at common law, while the common law treated the killing of a dog as a 
mere destruction of property.186  The Tennessee legislature seems to have 
intended to permit recovery for a type of harm not classically compensable 
at common law.  The statute should be so construed. 
The answer to the second is less clear but potentially equally useful.  
In the paradigm patent infringement case, as in the standard common law 
case, validity and infringement (and hence liability) are typically contested 
and fault is a priori unclear.  Congress may therefore have viewed it 
appropriate that patent law adhere, for the most part,187 to the tried-and-
true principles of the common law of damages.  In the paradigm case of 
copyright infringement, by contrast, validity and infringement are often 
obvious; damages, much less so.  Congress may therefore have thought it 
fair in the standard case to treat copyright infringers as having accepted 
the risks of getting caught, deprive them of any windfall by reason of 
difficulties in proof of damages by the copyright owner, and include a 
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significant punitive or deterrent component in the damages available.  If 
so, again, the statute should be so construed. 
2.  Structuring Statutory Damage Litigation to Permit Effective Judicial 
Review 
Premise 2: In enacting statutory damage rules, legislatures have 
typically concluded that the ordinary common law of damages is 
inadequate to their purposes for one or more of two reasons.  First, some 
portion of an award may be intended to approximate plaintiff’s likely 
actual damages, possibly including damages not compensable at classic 
common law, without requiring proof of such damages.  Second, even if 
plaintiffs have suffered no actual damages, some portion may be intended 
to encourage them to sue to vindicate the public policy protected by the 
statute.  Any award in excess of the amounts needed to accomplish these 
first two objectives is likely to be deterrent or punitive, and therefore 
subject to the concerns courts face in setting or reviewing deterrent or 
punitive awards. 
The problem for judges and juries is that the damages that perform 
these different functions are typically wrapped together in a single lump 
sum.  Juries do not typically award one amount as an approximation of 
likely actual damages, a second to induce plaintiff to litigate, and a third 
as punishment for the wrong.  Were they to do so, such awards would 
likely be much better anchored in reality.  Because juries are invited 
instead to award a single lump sum, however, they probably give little 
separate thought to each of these separate functions.  The single lump sum 
is more likely to be awarded from the gut—that is, “as the court considers 
just.”  And this, in turn, is likely to make judicial review of the resulting 
award for compliance with the law deeply problematic. 
If it is thought to be desirable to better anchor statutory damage awards 
in the facts of the particular case and the purposes of the particular statute, 
a first step might be to ask juries to award separate amounts to effectuate 
each of that statute’s purposes—one to approximate likely actual damages 
(not proven actual damages, since plaintiffs are not required to prove their 
actual damages), a second as a token to induce plaintiffs to sue to vindicate 
the policies underlying the statute (but only if the first is inadequate to the 
purpose), and a third as punishment.  Thus, for example, a jury considering 
an award of statutory damages for the unlawful downloading of twenty-
four songs might conclude that (1) $240 generously approximates 
plaintiff’s likely actual damages, (2) $5000 plus attorneys’ fees is 
sufficient to give plaintiff an incentive to litigate, and (3) a further award 
in some amount (probably not $1.92 million) is just punishment in the 
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circumstances.  A mechanism for asking juries to just do this already 
exists—the special verdict. 
Another possibility would be to permit introduction of evidence of 
actual damages or likely actual damages not by plaintiff, since plaintiffs 
are not required to prove actual damages, but by defendant.  If a defendant 
accused of having unlawfully downloaded twenty-four songs can put 
before the jury the fact that she could have purchased those same songs 
lawfully for ninety-nine cents each, it seems much less likely that the jury 
will award a judgment of $1.92 million against her for her wrongful action. 
In response, some may assert that one of the purposes of statutory 
damage provisions is to make actual damages irrelevant.  This, however, 
is not true.  One of the purposes is to relieve plaintiff of his evidentiary 
burden in circumstances in which actual damages are hard to prove.188  But 
clearly, the amount of actual harm inflicted is relevant to whether an award 
of any particular size would be “just”—the statutory benchmark under the 
Copyright Act.  To preclude defendant from effectively litigating whether 
plaintiff’s requested award is “just” would be to preclude her from 
defending herself altogether in a case with strong punitive overtones.  It 
would be like prohibiting a criminal defendant from introducing 
mitigating evidence at a sentencing hearing. 
In judge-tried cases, problems can also be minimized if finders of fact 
look to awards in similar cases as precedent, as courts now commonly do 
when making statutory damage awards under the Migrant and Seasonal 
Agricultural Worker Protection Act.189  Technically, of course, such 
awards are not “law,” and have no precedential value.  Seeking 
consistency among awards, however, minimizes the likelihood of 
disparate awards on similar facts and will eventually produce a set of de 
facto common law rules as to what may be “just” in the circumstances. 
3.  Drafting Unambiguous Statutory Damage Rules Scaled to the 
Severity of the Offense 
We are likely to be stuck with open-ended and ambiguous statutory 
damage provisions for many decades to come.  In the meantime, however, 
legislatures can do much to avoid problems by writing new statutes more 
carefully.  As has been noted, for example, damages under the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968190 are scaled to the severity of 
                                                          
 188.  Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1053–54 (D. Minn. 2010), 
vacated, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 189.  See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 190.  Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522); see also 
Karnezis, supra note 109. 
2018 STATUTORY DAMAGES 555 
the offense: (1) between $50 and $500 for a first offense of privately 
viewing a non-encrypted video or radio communication not for an illegal 
purpose and not for commercial advantage, (2) between $100 and $1000 
for a repeat offender, still not for an illegal purpose and not for commercial 
advantage, (3) but if the offender has an illegal purpose or obtains a 
commercial advantage, damages equal to the greater of actual damages or 
the greater of $100 per day of violation or $10,000 total.191  Had Congress 
similarly distinguished between commercial use and personal use 
downloading under the Copyright Act, much mischief could have been 
avoided.192 
Even providing non-binding guidance within the statute itself can 
improve decision-making.  Consider, for example, the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act, which provides for statutory damages in the 
discretion of the court, but asks the court to consider at least three factors: 
(1) the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, 
(2) the nature of the noncompliance, and (3) the extent to which the 
noncompliance was intentional.193  Placing such guidance within the 
statute itself avoids arguments about whether consideration of legislative 
history is permitted in statutory interpretation. 
B.  Anchoring and Over-Compensation 
Anchoring, a psychological quirk in the way we process information, 
may exacerbate problems with the rationality of awards under some 
statutes—the Copyright Act comes particularly to mind.  Psychologist 
Daniel Kahneman uses the following example to explain how anchoring 
works.  If you are asked how old Gandhi was when he died and do not 
know the answer, you will tend to give the average age people die.  If you 
are instead asked whether Ghandi was 114 years old when he died, you 
will likely give a much higher answer; if you are asked whether he was 35 
years old when he died, a much lower.  Logically, how the question is 
asked should not matter.  But repeated experiments prove that it does.  We 
                                                          
 191.  18 U.S.C. § 2520(c) (2012). 
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556 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
tend to use any number included in the question as an anchor in 
determining our answer.194 
Consider two possible ways of writing the Copyright Act’s statutory 
damage provision.  
First: “The copyright owner may recover an award of statutory 
damages in a sum of not less than $750, as the court considers just.” 
Second: “The copyright owner may recover an award of statutory 
damages in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $150,000, as the 
court considers just.” 
The anchoring literature predicts that juries will use the concrete dollar 
amounts given in the second version as anchors.  In a case that seems 
factually midway between the worst possible and best possible (but still 
unlawful) behaviour, they may split the difference, awarding, say, $75,000 
per work infringed—almost exactly what the jury awarded in Capitol 
Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset,195 to punish a defendant who had illegally 
downloaded and shared twenty-four songs over the Internet.  Had the 
Capitol Records jury instead been instructed to award statutory damages 
“in a sum of not less than $750, as you consider just” for the wrong of 
downloading twenty-four songs, anchoring theory suggests that the award 
would likely have been much lower. 
It is possible, therefore, that setting a high upper bound to statutory 
damage awards, rather than no upper bound, may result in higher average 
awards—for irrational reasons.  The Capitol Records jury may not have 
set its award at $1.92 million for any of the reasons Congress had in mind 
when it wrote the statute; it may rather have been influenced—
irrationally—by a number Congress placed in the statute as an upper limit 
on damage awards, a number not intended to function as an anchor at all.  
Legislatures may wish to consider this problem when considering whether 
to set high upper bounds to such awards. 
C.  Class Actions and the Multiplier Effect 
Both statutory damages and class actions are techniques for allowing 
corrective litigation to go forward notwithstanding the sometimes small 
actual damages, if any, suffered by each individual victim.196  Separately, 
they may each make sense.  Combined, however, they can produce 
                                                          
 194.  DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 119–128 (2011) (explaining ways that our 
brains work to process information and make decisions). 
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outlandish results.  In the introduction, we noted the Chuck E. Cheese 
litigation, in which defendant admitted to having printed more than five 
digits of its customers’ credit card numbers.197  Under the Fair and 
Accurate Credit Transactions Act,  defendant would have been liable for 
statutory damages of between $100 and $1,000 for each individual 
failure—an amount Congress apparently thought sufficient to induce 
individual plaintiffs to sue to enforce the Act.198  Because the case was 
brought as a class action, however, defendant’s total exposure for its 
harmless one-digit mistake was almost $2 billion. 
We have called this the Chuck E. Cheese problem; it might also be 
called the “multiplier effect.”  Class actions take amounts thought to be 
reasonable to induce individual plaintiffs to bring individual actions, 
notwithstanding the lack of actual damages, and turn them into caricatures 
of a lawyer’s fevered imagination.  As the court wrote more soberly in an 
order approving a settlement in Parker v. Time Warner Entertainment Co.: 
“Each of these tools is intended to encourage the prosecution of cases that 
would otherwise be too costly for an individual plaintiff to pursue.  The 
combination of the two threatens defendants with the multiplication of 
statutory damages, possibly beyond the contemplation of Congress and the 
limits of due process.”199 
As is often true in the law of statutory damages, whether denial of 
class certification is an appropriate solution to the problem is not 
unambiguously clear. 
The problem was recognized as early as 1969 when, in the widely-
cited case of Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.,200 the District 
Court for the Southern District of New York rejected class certification in 
a TILA class action where “the proposed recovery of $100 each for some 
130,000 class members would be a horrendous, possibly annihilating 
punishment, unrelated to any damage to the purported class or to any 
benefit to defendant, for what is at most a technical and debatable violation 
of the Truth in Lending Act.”201  Three years later, in Kline v. Coldwell, 
Banker & Co.,202 a case under the Sherman Act involving requested 
certification of both plaintiff and defendant classes, the Ninth Circuit 
appeared to follow suit.  “In order to certify the action as a proper class 
action,” the court reasoned, “it is necessary to demonstrate that the class 
                                                          
 197.  See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy as required by Rule 23(b)(3).”203  This 
requirement was not met, the court held, if a case sought “outrageous 
amounts in statutory penalt[ies]” such that it would lead to an “absurd[] 
result.”204 
In a 1995 case similarly not involving statutory damages, Judge 
Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s 
reading of the class action rule.205  The court ordered decertification of the 
plaintiff class in question in part because of 
a concern with forcing these defendants to stake their companies on the 
outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of 
bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal liability, when it is entirely 
feasible to allow a final, authoritative determination of their liability for 
the colossal misfortune that has befallen [plaintiff class] to emerge from 
a decentralized process of multiple trials, involving different juries, and 
different standards of liability, in different jurisdictions.206 
Were class certification permitted to stand, Judge Posner wrote, 
defendants might “easily be facing $25 billion in potential liability 
(conceivably more), and with it bankruptcy.  They may not wish to roll 
these dice.  That is putting it mildly.  They will be under intense pressure 
to settle.”207  He went on to quote Judge Friendly, who had called 
settlements induced by a small probability of an immense judgment in a 
class action “blackmail settlements.”208 
The Second Circuit expressed similar concerns in Parker v. Time 
Warner Entertainment Co.209  Plaintiff there sought to certify a class of 
cable television subscribers, each of whom qualified to receive minimum 
statutory damages of $1000 for Time Warner’s alleged violation of the 
Cable Communications Policy Act.210  The court acknowledged “the 
potential for a devastatingly large damages award, out of all reasonable 
proportion to the actual harm suffered by members of the plaintiff 
class.”211  “By seeking to collect statutory damages of $1,000 for each of 
                                                          
 203.  Id. at 233. 
 204.  Id. at 234–35. 
 205.  See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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up to 12 million cable subscribers,” the court observed, “[the] lawsuit 
could potentially impose on Defendant Time Warner liability for $12 
billion.  Even for one of the world’s largest corporations, that is a lot of 
money.”212  Nevertheless, the court reversed as premature the district 
court’s refusal to certify the requested class.213  Six years later, as part of 
a comprehensive settlement of the case, class certification was granted.214  
District courts in other cases, however, continued to follow Ratner.215 
Then, in Bateman v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc.,216 the Ninth 
Circuit reversed course.  The problem with certifying a class in Kline, the 
court observed, was not the size of the potential award relative to the size 
of the defendant.  The problem was rather that certification of the 
defendant class in that case would have rendered each member of the class 
jointly and severally liable for penalties imposed for other members’ 
wrongdoing—an absurd result not present in the standard FACTA case.217  
But “[t]o deny class certification based on the potential amount of damages 
as compared to the extent of harm,” the court reasoned, “presumes that 
Congress left it to the courts to evaluate the relative amount of liability 
necessary to serve the statute’s compensatory and deterrent purposes.”218  
Noting that Congress had capped statutory damages in class actions in a 
number of other contexts, the court noted that Congress had not done so 
with regard to FACTA.  “In the absence of such affirmative steps to limit 
liability, we must assume that Congress intended FACTA’s remedial 
scheme to operate as it was written.  To limit class availability merely on 
the basis of ‘enormous’ potential liability that Congress explicitly 
provided for would subvert congressional intent.”219  The court left open 
the possibility of a different result, however, if “the potential liability 
would result in bankruptcy.”220 
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In the wake of Bateman, district courts in the Ninth Circuit began 
certifying plaintiff classes in FACTA cases.  In In re Toys “R” Us-
Delaware,221 for example, the trial court reversed its prior denial of class 
certification in a case involving potential statutory damages of between 
$2.9 billion and $29 billion (the company’s net worth was $117 
million.)222  Unsurprisingly, within a month after the class was certified, 
the case settled.223 
What is now the law?  In the Ninth Circuit, Bateman rules.  
Nationwide FACTA class actions are therefore brought in the Ninth 
Circuit.  No other circuit appears to have had an opportunity to speak to 
the question.  Given the Seventh and Second Circuits’ expressed 
reservations in prior cases, it is not clear they would follow Bateman.  
Given that plaintiffs’ attorneys can effectively choose their circuit, 
however, we may never know. 
A simple legislative solution is readily available.  As has been noted, 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act of 1978, the Electronic Fund 
Transfer Act of 1978, and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker 
Protection Act of 1983 all include explicit caps on class action statutory 
damage awards.224  All statutory damage rules with respect to which 
plaintiff class actions are a real possibility should so provide. 
In the meantime, corporate defendants face an impossible dilemma.  
As the Bateman court noted, defendants may ultimately seek reduction of 
any award that is unconstitutionally excessive.225  (The Bateman court 
itself reserved judgment on this question).226  To do so, however, they must 
forego settlement and endure the entry of judgment—a judgment which if 
upheld may spell corporate ruin.  There is no way to test the constitutional 
question without placing the entire company at risk.227  So defendants are 
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under great pressure to settle even statutory damage class action suits of 
questionable merit. 
D.  Excessive Statutory Damages 
Many legal scholars have compared the problem of excessive statutory 
damages to punitive damage awards, which are now subject to due process 
limitations.228  In the Time Warner case, the Second Circuit recognized the 
potential due process concerns raised when statutory damages are 
aggregated in class actions, citing State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. 
v. Campbell, part of the Supreme Court’s excessive punitive damages 
jurisprudence.229  It noted, however, that such due process concerns could 
not be raised without “actual evidence presented that raises a reasonable 
possibility that principles of due process may restrict an ultimate damages 
award.”230  As a practical matter, of course, in the face of multiplier effects, 
most defendants cannot afford to risk judgment; they settle instead. 
Were a court ever to reach the excessive damages issue, it would need 
to resolve a threshold question: Are legislatively authorized statutory 
damage awards subject to the Supreme Court’s punitive damage 
jurisprudence?  Or are they rather limited, if at all, by the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of “excessive fines”? 
With respect to the first, the Supreme Court held that excessive 
punitive damage awards may violate the due process clause in BMW of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore.231  Gore claimed that BMW had committed 
fraud by hiding prior repair work to the car it sold him.232  There was 
evidence that BMW had done so and had engaged in similar practices 
nationwide.233  The jury awarded Gore actual damages of $4,000 and 
punitive damages of $4 million, an amount later cut to $2 million.234  In 
reviewing punitive damage awards under the due process clause, the 
Supreme Court held, courts should consider “[1] the degree of 
reprehensibility of the [defendant’s conduct]; [2] the disparity between the 
harm or potential harm suffered by [the plaintiff] and [the] punitive 
damages award; and [3] the difference between this remedy and the civil 
                                                          
 228.  See, e.g., Holmstrand, supra note 180 (noting the due process implications when uninjured 
plaintiffs seek statutory damages); Scheuerman, supra note 16, at 131–32 (arguing that courts should 
apply the same punitive damages due process framework to aggregated statutory damages). 
 229.  Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 230.  See id. 
 231.  517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 232.  Id. at 563. 
 233.  Id. at 563–64. 
 234.  Id. at 565, 567. 
562 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”235  The amount of 
any such award should be no more than that which will support the twin 
rationales of punishment and deterrence.236  In the circumstances, it held, 
a 500 to 1 ratio of punitive to actual damages was excessive.237  In State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,238 the Court noted 
further that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive 
and compensatory damages . . . will satisfy due process.”239 
Consider, in light of this jurisprudence, the Capitol Records, Inc. v. 
Thomas-Rasset jury’s award of $1.92 million as damages for downloading 
twenty-four songs for personal use.  Some portion of that amount was for 
actual damages—probably not more than a few hundred dollars.  If the 
remainder was punitive, the award clearly violated the standards set forth 
in Gore and Campbell.  The problem, of course, is that the $1.92 award 
was not separated into actual and punitive components.  What this means, 
however, is that if Gore and Campbell apply to statutory damages, the task 
of disaggregating lump-sum statutory damage awards becomes more 
urgent. 
It is possible, however, as the Supreme Court itself suggested in St. 
Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Williams, that statutory 
damages should be thought of instead as being awarded in lieu of penalties 
payable to the state.240  If so, constitutional limitations on such damages 
would derive from the excessive fines clause, not from the due process 
clause.  In United States v. Bajakajian,241 the Supreme Court held that a 
challenged forfeiture constituted an excessive fine within the meaning of 
the Eighth Amendment because it was “grossly disproportional to the 
gravity of the defendant’s offense.”242  Importantly, Bajakajian 
proportionality focuses on the defendant and his actions, not on the 
broader social problem the statute in question is intended to address.  Prof. 
Barry Johnson explains: 
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The majority embraced an individualized, desert-oriented vision of 
proportionality review, focusing on a comparison of the gravity of the 
individual’s particular offense with the severity of the particular punitive 
forfeiture imposed.  In contrast, the dissent embraced a utilitarian 
proportionality review, emphasizing legislative determinations about the 
seriousness of classes of offenses and taking into account factors not 
related to the individual’s offense, such as the need for severe 
punishment to serve crime control interests.243 
Were Bajakajian and the excessive fines clause to be applied to Mrs. 
Thomas-Rasset and her twenty-four downloaded songs, for example, the 
focus would be on the gravity of her particular offense, not on the gravity 
of illegal downloading generally. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to resolve which line of cases, 
Gore or Bajakajian, applies to statutory damages or what either demands 
in the statutory damage context, if it applies.  For our purposes, it is 
sufficient to note that until the various components of lump-sum statutory 
damage awards can be disaggregated, applying either will be difficult.  If 
neither Gore nor Bajakajian applies, however, avoiding constitutional 
limitations on excessive penalties is trivial: a legislature need only 
structure such penalties as statutory damages.  One assumes that this 
cannot be so. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
Courts and commentators have not heretofore treated statutory 
damage provisions as a class of legal rules with common purposes, 
problems, and possible solutions.  As this article demonstrates, doing so 
may advance our understanding of such provisions, assist courts in 
interpreting and administering specific such provisions, and help 
legislatures draft new statutory damage rules in ways that minimize 
problems and more effectively accomplish the legislatures’ intended 
purposes. 
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